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PROPERTY
W. Wade Berryhill*
I. 1986 LEGISLATION
The 1986 General Assembly may be remembered as much for
what it did not do as for what it did. Carried over into the next
session was House Bill 810, which would have abolished dower and
curtesy in favor of a statutory share for the surviving spouse in the
deceased spouse's estate. Of course, passage of this bill would have
ushered in significant change in the practice of decedents' estates.
Significantly, passage of the bill also would have legislatively over-
ruled recent judicial and legislative activity which has created the
sole and separate estate, for both female and male, allowing cir-
cumvention of the surviving spouse's claim of curtesy or dower.1
Many believe House Bill 810 is a long-awaited change whose time
has come, but it must wait at least one more year.2
Of those bills which became law, most noteworthy was House
Bill 207.3 Virginia Code ("Code") section 36-91(c) now provides
that group homes, family care homes, or foster homes wherein no
more than six physically handicapped, mentally ill, mentally re-
tarded or developmentally disabled persons reside, with or without
one or more resident counselors or staff personnel, shall be consid-
ered single family residences for the purpose of interpreting re-
strictive covenants executed after July 1, 1986.4 This legislation
was in direct response to Omega Corp. v. Malloy,5 a 1984 Virginia
Supreme Court decision which upheld the trial court's determina-
tion that a group home for the mentally retarded does not consti-
tute a "single-family use."6 A key finding in the case was that the
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., 1967,
Arkansas State University; J.D., 1972, University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1976, Columbia
University.
1. See Berryhill, Property: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RiCH. L. REv. 769, 780
(1985); see also Jacobs v. Meade, 227 Va. 284, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
21 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
2. See Berryhill, supra note 1, at 780 n.6.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-91(c) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
4. Id.
5. 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984).
6. Id. at 19, 319 S.E.2d at 732.
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presence of a counselor living in the home converted the residence
into a facility.'
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Contracts
1. Arbitration
In Maynard Construction Co. v. Driver,8 a landowner filed suit
against a contractor for breach of a contract to construct a single-
family residence. The contract provided that all claims or disputes
would be decided by arbitration. The circuit court denied the con-
tractor's motion for arbitration and entered judgment in favor of
the owner. On appeal, appellee owner conceded "that an agree-
ment to arbitrate in a contract is mandatory and irrevocable uni-
laterally."' Since the appellee confessed error on the main issue
under review, the court concluded that an obvious result was de-
manded. Accordingly, the trial court's decision was reversed and
the case was remanded with directions to stay the proceedings to
permit the controversy to be submitted to arbitration.
2. Breach of Contract
In Martin v. Terjelian,10 purchaser sought to recover a $10,000
deposit which he argued was paid under an unconsummated oral
contract to purchase real estate. The vendors defended the action,
alleging that this deposit was an additional payment under a previ-
ously executed written contract which provided that deposits made
under the contract would be forfeited as liquidated damages in the
7. Id. The other significant areas of legislative change include: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.42,
-79.72 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (condominiums); id. § 10-279 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (waste disposal);
id. §§ 55-222, -248.21:1 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (requires 120 days written notice for termination of
lease if due to rehabilitation and building has at least four residential units; changes rental
agreement termination date requirement for military personnel); id. §§ 62.1-44.85 to -44.106
(Cum. Supp. 1986) (ground-personnel); id. §§ 62.1-44.85, -44.87, -44.90 to .93, -44.96 to .10, -
44.101:1 (ground water withdrawal); id. §§ 15.1-261.1, -285, -364, 21-122.1 (powers of local
government); id. § 54-25.1 (surveyor's duties); id. § 55-184.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (sale of es-
cheated property); id. §§ 55-106.5, 33.1-163.1, 55-66.3, 55-9, 55-108 (recording and indexing);
id. § 34-5 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (homestead exemption may not be claimed against debt owed
for support of minor children); id. § 55-425 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (clarification of exception to
Real Estate Cooperative Act). This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but only highlights
certain changes which have broader interest.
8. 230 Va. 79, 334 S.E.2d 567 (1985).
9. Id. at 82-83, 334 S.E.2d at 569.
10. 231 Va. 365, 344 S.E.2d 894 (1986).
926 [Vol. 20:925
PROPERTY
event of breach. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's determination that the additional $10,000 deposit
was paid toward the execution of a proposed second contract when
difficulties were encountered in obtaining financing under the orig-
inal contract. Since the proposed second contract was never exe-
cuted, the purchaser was entitled to recover the $10,000 paid in
anticipation of the second contract despite the fact that the pur-
chaser received, without objection, a receipt signed by the vendors
marked "non-refundable deposit."
3. Brokers-Real Estate Agents
Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc. v. Clay11 involved a broker's
suit for a commission on a listing agreement, a counterclaim by the
landowner against both the broker and the sales agent of the bro-
ker for breach of fiduciary duty, and a third-party motion for judg-
ment by the landowner against the sales agent in the event the
landowner should be liable to the broker for the commission. The
landowner alleged that the sales agent did not explain the subordi-
nation agreement contained in the original sales contract which va-
ried from the terms of the listing agreement, and that this omis-
sion resulted in renegotiation and settlement in a second contract
with the purchaser. Upon trial by jury, all verdicts were returned
in the landowner's favor. The jury found against the broker's claim
for commission. The jury also found for the landowner in her coun-
terclaim against the broker and sales agent for $4,000, and for her
claim against the sales agent for $1.00.
On appeal, the broker and sales agent alleged that since the bro-
ker's liability was predicated solely upon the doctrine of respon-
dent superior, the finding that the servant-sales agent was liable
for only $1.00 exonerated both master and servant. However, the
Virginia Supreme Court upheld the trial court's entry of judgment
against both broker and sales agent, citing Cape Charles Flying
Service v. Nottingham.1 2
11. 231 Va. 170, 343 S.E.2d 297 (1986).
12. 187 Va. 444, 47 S.E.2d 540 (1948). In Nottingham, the court stated that:
Verdicts are to be [fairly] construed, and, if the point in issue is substantially decided
by the verdict, it is good, and when the meaning of the jury can be satisfactorily
collected from the verdict, upon matters involved in the issue, it ought not to be set
aside for irregularity or want of form in its wording.
Id. at 454, 47 S.E.2d at 545 (quoting Peters v. Johnson, 50 W. Va. 644, 645-46, 41 S.E. 190,
190 (1902)).
1986]
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4. Recision
In Lerner v. Gudelsky Co.,13 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that under the "plain meaning" rule, the court is not at liberty to
search beyond the contractual instrument itself. Thus, the trial
court erred in relying on extrinsic evidence to ascertain the pur-
chaser's degree of experience concerning difficulties to which he
might be exposed by possible demands of the Virginia Department
of Highways and Transportation (VDH & T). The court scruti-
nized a written agreement between the parties for purchase of
partnership interests of land which provided that the vendors, as
of the date of settlement, had no knowledge of any administrative
action which would impede development of the subject property
and that the continuing truth of that representation would be a
condition precedent to the purchaser's obligation. The court also
held that the vendors had the burden of proof that the condition
of sale had been satisfied, and that there was a failure of condition
precedent where the VDH & T refused a permit even though it
might have been persuaded by the expenditure of additional funds
by the developer (purchasers). The purchaser, therefore, was enti-
tled to the return of the earnest money deposit.14
In dissent, Justice Cochran, joined by Justice Stephenson, con-
cluded that the contract was ambiguous and therefore extrinsic ev-
idence was proper. Since the purchaser was familiar with the
problems of obtaining permits with the VDH & T he should have
been on notice of the potential cost of highway improvements that
might be required of a developer. Justice Cochran noted that any
contractual ambiguities should have been resolved against the
drafter (purchaser) and, therefore, the change in requirements
which made highway improvement more expensive should not have
relieved the purchaser of his obligation.1 5
5. Statute of Frauds
In Drake v. Livesay,1 6 an action for breach of contract, Drake
contended that the defendant, Livesay, acting on his own behalf
and as agent for his wife, contracted to sell a certain parcel of land.
Though the contract was oral, both parties allegedly agreed to re-
13. 230 Va. 124, 334 S.E.2d 579 (1985).
14. Id. at 132-34, 334 S.E.2d at 584-85.
15. Id. at 134-36, 334 S.E.2d at 585-87 (Cochran, J., dissenting).
16. 231 Va. 117, 341 S.E.2d 186 (1986).
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duce the terms to writing "the next day." Three days later, how-
ever, Livesay sold the parcel to another party for more money.
Drake alleged that although the contract was never reduced to
writing, it nevertheless was evidenced within the requirements of
the statute of frauds by an apology letter written to Drake from
Livesay which qualified as a memorandum under Code section 11-
2. Livesay defended on the basis that the letter was an insufficient
memorandum for three reasons: (1) the letter failed to express the
essential terms of the contract; (2) the letter was not signed by
Mrs. Livesay, who owned the property with her husband as tenants
by the entireties; and (3) the letter was a memorandum only of an
offer to sell and not of a bilateral contract.
17
The Virginia Supreme Court held that while the failure of Mrs.
Livesay's signature on the memorandum would make a claim for
specific performance fail, Mr. Livesay could be held liable for dam-
ages stemming from a contract to sell land where, at the time of
such contract, such land was not owned. Therefore, the letter was a
memorandum of an oral contract between Drake and Livesay suffi-
cient to support a breach of contract action. The question of Mrs.
Livesay's liability depended upon proof of agency by the plaintiff.
The existence of a bilateral contract between Drake and Livesay
could be inferred from the letter wherein Livesay stated "I did to-
day sell to the Turners. . .this same property that I had told you
we would sell to you."' 8
In Troyer v. Troyer,19 the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's denial of a husband's claim of ownership in property held
in his wife's name. The court reasoned that valuable consideration
existed in the wife's agreement to seek no spousal or child support
in exchange for her husband's ownership interest in an executory
contract to purchase the property, thus the husband had no claim
of ownership. Further, the court found that deposition testimony
given under oath in the divorce action satisfied the requirement of
a sufficient memorandum under the statute of frauds.
20
17. Id. at 118, 341 S.E.2d at 187.
18. Id. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 187.
19. 231 Va. 90, 341 S.E.2d 182 (1986).
20. See VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
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6. Statute of Limitations
In Pigott v. Moran,2' the purchasers of a house and lot brought
an action for damages based on fraud against the real estate agent,
the realtor and the contractor. The purchasers had requested that
the real estate agent find a dwelling in a completely residential
community. They alleged that they had sustained financial loss
due to the sale to them of land abutting commercial and industrial
zoned property. The circuit court dismissed on grounds of expira-
tion of the statute of limitations.
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the purchas-
ers' claim was a personal action governed by the one-year statute
of limitation 22 rather than the five-year statute for actions for in-
jury to property.23 The court reasoned that the fraud allegedly
committed by the realtor had no impact on the real property itself.
Instead, the defendants' conduct was directed at the plaintiffs per-
sonally. Therefore, the cause of action was adjudged to have ac-
crued in March 1980, when neighbors told the purchasers about
the industrial zoning of the adjacent property, and not on April 22,
1980, when the clerk of court confirmed to plaintiffs that the
neighbors' information was correct.24
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stephenson concluded that
with the enactment of Title 8.01, the revisors had eliminated the
distinction between direct and indirect damage to property.25 Sec-
tion 8.01-243 of the Virginia Code provides a two-year limitation
for "personal injuries" and a five-year limitation for "injury to
property." Justice Stephenson stated his belief that this was a per-
sonal action for "injury to property" and therefore section 8.01-
243(B) applied. The result reached by the majority has perpetu-
ated the malaise which code revisors sought to eliminate.
In Cape Henry Towers v. National Gypsum Co., 26 a council of
co-owners brought a claim for alleged defects in construction of a
condominium complex. In turn, the builder instituted a third-party
claim against the manufacturers of the exterior panels and the oil-
based polyester resin coating. The circuit court entered judgment
21. 231 Va. 76, 341 S.E.2d 179 (1986).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
23. Id. § 8.01-243(B) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
24. Pigott, 231 Va. at 79-81, 341 S.E.2d at 181-82.
25. Id. at 81-82, 341 S.E.2d at 182 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
26. 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985).
930 [Vol. 20:925
PROPERTY
sustaining the manufacturers' defense of the statute limitations on
the third party claim and the builder appealed. The Virginia Su-
preme Court held that the five-year statute of limitations on
claims arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an im-
provement to real property operates to protect manufacturers and
suppliers of ordinary building materials incorporated into improve-
ments to real property.27 The court reasoned that the legislative
intent embodied in the 1973 and 1977 amendments was to exempt
from protection only manufacturers and suppliers of any equip-
ment or machinery or other articles installed in a structure.8
B. Condominium
In Frantz v. CBI Fairmac Corp.,29 the court determined that
unit owners were bound by a settlement reached between the unit
owners' association and the condominium developer in a suit over
the violation of the full and accurate disclosure requirement of the
Condominium Act.30
The issue in Montgomery v. Columbia Knoll Condominium
Council31 was whether a condominium owners' association had the
authority to replace windows within an individual condominium
unit over the objection of the owners of the particular unit. The
association argued that since the units did not have individual me-
ters for utilities and since expenses were apportioned among the
unit owners, the association could replace the windows and assess
the costs to the unit owner in an effort to reduce the common ex-
penses. The trial court agreed and found that the association was
acting within its authority for the "common good. '3 2
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the associa-
tion's reliance on VI/Section 2 of the bylaws of the condominium
was misplaced.3 3 This section limited liability of unit owners to
27. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (Cum. Supp. 1986).
28. National Gypsum, 229 Va. 596, 331 S.E.2d 476 (1985).
29. 229 Va. 444, 331 S.E.2d 390 (1985).
30. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.90 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
31. 231 Va. 437, 344 S.E.2d 912 (1986).
32. Id. at 438, 344 S.E.2d at 912.
33. The bylaws provided as follows:
Every co-owner must perform promptly all maintenance and repair work within his
own [unit] which, if omitted, would affect the Project and its entirety or in a part
belonging to other co-owners, and is expressly responsible for the damages and liabili-
ties which may result from his failure to do so.
Id. at 439, 344 S.E.2d at 913.
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"maintenance and repair." Since the windows were not part of the
"common elements," the installation of insulated windows consti-
tuted an improvement to individual units which was beyond the
authority of the association.3 4
C. Deeds
The construction of an express reservation in a deed was the is-
sue in Allen v. Green. 5 This deed subjected real property to a life
estate in the vendor and reserved the vendor "the right. . . to re-
move the portable building to be erected thereon at any time prior
to her death. . . .Upon her death, the portable building. . . shall
become a part of the estate of the [vendor]." 36 Upon the death of
the vendor, the executor of the vendor's estate attempted to re-
move the prefabricated building. Purchasers from the original re-
maindermen claimed ownership of the building. The executor filed
a motion for declaratory judgment. The trial court held that the
building became a "permanent improvement" and belonged to the
purchasers (defendants) of the remainder upon the death of the
life tenant.3 7
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and declared that the pur-
chasers had constructive notice of reservation in the deed which
formed a part of their vendor's chain of title. There was only one
building on the tract. The concept of portability is not necessarily
inconsistent with the fixed nature of buildings. The purchasers ig-
nored the reservation at their peril, and also were charged with
notice of other matters which might be disclosed upon a prudent
inquiry.3 8
D. Deeds of Trust-Due-On-Sale Clause
In Barnes v. VNB Mortgage Corp.,39 the Virginia Supreme
Court held that the proposed transfer of a beneficiary's interest
under a land trust agreement would trigger the due-on-sale clause
in a deed of trust. The mortgagee, therefore, was permitted to ac-
34. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.79 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
35. 229 Va. 588, 331 S.E.2d 473 (1985).
36. Id. at 591, 331 S.E.2d at 474.
37. Id. at 592, 331 S.E.2d at 475.
38. Id. at 594, 331 S.E.2d at 476.
39. 230 Va. 4, 334 S.E.2d 531 (1985).
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celerate the obligation of the borrower.40
E. Eminent Domain
In State Highway & Transportation Commissioner v. Denni-
son,41 the Commissioner appealed the trial court's failure to strike
for cause two members of the panel of commissioners. These mem-
bers had acknowledged on voir dire that they had prior business
dealings with and were friends of the landowner. The trial court's
action left the Commissioner with no choice but to remove them
by peremptory strikes in the eminent domain proceeding.42 The
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, ruling that exclu-
sion is a matter of discretion with the trial court and friendship
alone is not a sufficient ground for disqualification. The court fur-
ther reasoned that although the landowner and prospective jurors
had conducted prior business, neither juror had any financial inter-
est related to -the issue they were being called upon to decide.43
F. Joint Tenancy
In Gifford v. Dennis,4 4 one joint tenant brought suit against a
second joint tenant claiming sole ownership of property conveyed
to them. The trial court found a resulting trust in favor of the
plaintiff. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed because the evi-
dence showed that: (1) the defendant was an accomodation maker
on the notes; (2) the defendant's name was placed in the deed as
security; and (3) the plaintiff had made all the payments on the
notes.45
G. Local Government
In City of Virginia Beach v. Green,48 the supreme court upheld
the city's action ordering the removal of a private, recreational,
wooden deck or patio extending forty feet onto the public ocean-
40. Id. at 12-13, 334 S.E.2d 535-36; accord Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651
F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., 223 Va. 131, 286 S.E.2d 215
(1982); United Va. Bank/Nat'l. v. Best, 223 Va. 112, 286 S.E.2d 221, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
879 (1982).
41. 231 Va. 239, 343 S.E.2d 324 (1986).
42. Id. at 241-42, 343 S.E.2d at 326.
43. Id. at 243, 343 S.E.2d at 327.
44. 230 Va. 193, 335 S.E.2d 371 (1985).
45. Id. at 199-200, 335 S.E.2d at 375.
46. 230 Va. 84, 334 S.E.2d 570 (1985).
1986]
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front beach area because it constituted an unlawful encroachment
on the public way. The court reasoned that the city had absolute
discretion to require removal without being required to adopt stan-
dards applying equally to all persons encroaching upon the public
way or to grant the owners a hearing. The court stated:
This is not the case of a private person engaged in a lawful activity
in a lawful way upon his own premises, conduct which ordinarily
would entitle the individual to equal protection of the laws against
the unrestrained discretion of government officials: Rather, this is
the case of unlawful use of public property.4
H. Marital Property
In Venable v. Venable,48 the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled
that upon decree of divorce, the trial court may grant a monetary
award to one party based upon the parties' interests and equities
in jointly titled marital property. Although the court may approve
a conveyance which satisfies the award, it does not have authority
to order either spouse to convey an interest in jointly titled prop-
erty to the other.49
I. Mechanics' Liens
In E.E. Stump Well Drilling, Inc. v. Willis,5 ° the Virginia Su-
preme Court interpreted Code section 43-16, which protects a
property owner in the event a general contractor defaults. On Feb-
ruary 16, 1981, plaintiff Willis contracted with McDaniels to
purchase a lot and house that McDaniels was in the process of con-
structing. The contract of purchase, however, was not recorded. In
March 1981, McDaniels engaged Stump Well Drilling to drill a
well on the property. Stump drilled the well and billed McDaniels,
but was never paid. Stump filed a mechanic's lien against the prop-
erty on June 23, 1981, naming McDaniels as owner. After McDan-
iels failed to complete construction of the house, Willis filed a bill
of complaint against McDaniels on August 6, 1981, seeking specific
performance of the purchase contract. Stump also was named as a
party defendant in the suit since the mechanic's lien encumbered
47. Id. at 88, 334 S.E.2d at 573.
48. 2 Va. App. 178, 342 S.E.2d 646 (1986).
49. Id. at 185, 342 S.E.2d at 650-51.
50. 230 Va. 445, 338 S.E.2d 841 (1986).
934 [Vol. 20:925
the property. Willis ultimately acquired the property at a foreclo-
sure sale and completed construction of the house for $7,500. The
trial court ruled that this sum was entitled to priority over the
Stump lien under Code section 43-16.51 Stump appealed, arguing
that section 43-16 protects only owners of record when the
mechanic's lien is filed. Therefore, the amount Willis expended to
complete the house would not take priority over the Stump lien.
The trial court framed the issue in terms of "equitable ownership"
as well as "title ownership."52
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, and held that the
mechanics' lien statutes and recording statutes must be read to-
gether. The owner of an equitable interest is protected by section
43-16 only if the contract or other document evidencing his inter-
est is recorded. Since Willis did not record her contract before
Stump placed the mechanic's lien on the property, she was not eli-
gible for the priority granted by section 43-16.63
J. Restrictive Covenants
In Marks v. Wingfield,M plaintiffs sought to enjoin the place-
ment of recreational campers on lots in a subdivision containing
restrictions against the erection of "shacks, tents, house trailers or
temporary dwellings of any kind whatsoever."55 Defendants
claimed that the restrictions were invalid and unenforceable be-
cause prior flooding and a county ordinance protecting against
flood damage had changed the character of the neighborhood from
residential to recreational.5" Reversing the trial court's denial of an
injunction, the supreme court held that no radical change in the
character of the neighborhood had occurred, because the subdivi-
sion had always been both residential and recreational in charac-
ter. "When a party seeks to defeat a covenant on the grounds of
changed conditions in the neighborhood, he must prove that condi-
tions in the whole neighborhood have changed so radically as to
51. This section provides that if "the owner" is compelled to complete a building because
of the general contractor's default, the amount expended by "the owner" for such comple-
tion has priority over all mechanics' liens placed on the building. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-16
(Repl. Vol. 1986).
52. Stump Well Drilling, 230 Va. at 447-48, 338 S.E.2d at 841-42.
53. Id. at 450, 338 S.E.2d at 843.
54. 229 Va. 573, 331 S.E.2d 463 (1985).
55. Id. at 575, 331 S.E.2d at 464.
56. Id. at 575-76, 331 S.E.2d at 464.
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virtually destroy the essential purposes and objectives of the
agreement.""7
K. Rule Against Perpetuities
At issue in The Ryland Group, Inc. v. Wills58 was whether a
contract violated the rule against perpetuities and therefore was
void. The purchaser of the realty (Ryland) filed a motion for judg-
ment against the seller (Wills) alleging a breach of contract, fraud
and misrepresentation. Ryland also filed suit against Wills and an-
other party (Capital), alleging interference with the contract. Ry-
land had agreed to buy three lots in a subdivision. Settlement was
scheduled to take place upon completion of specified work by the
seller, receipt of building permits by the purchaser, certification
from governmental water and sewer authorities, and Veterans Ad-
ministration approval. According to the agreement, Ryland also ac-
quired an option to purchase 255 additional lots upon the develop-
ment of various facilities by the seller, such as sewers, curbs, and
sidewalks. No provision was made for a settlement time but the
contract stated that time was of the essence. Wills conveyed the
lots subject to Ryland's purchase option to Capital. As a result,
Ryland instituted its present action. The trial court sustained Cap-
ital's demurrer, reasoning that since settlement might not occur
until development had been completed, which might be more than
twenty-one years, the contract violated the rule against
perpetuities.5 9
The supreme court reversed in a five part ruling, holding that:
(1) the rule against perpetuities is applicable to option contracts,
which are unenforceable if they may not be exercised within the
period of the rule; (2) an option to purchase which, pursuant to an
agreement, could only be exercised within a fixed period of less
than three years after the date of the agreement, did not violate
the rule against perpetuities; (3) it is a settled principle that con-
tract terms under control of the parties must be performed within
a reasonable time where the contract does not specify the time of
performance; (4) a reasonable time for completion of the develop-
ment of residential lots as a subdivision would be far less than
twenty-one years; and (5) the contract for sale of residential lots to
57. Id. at 576, 331 S.E.2d at 465.
58. 229 Va. 459, 331 S.E.2d 399 (1985).
59. Id. at 464, 331 S.E.2d at 403.
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be developed as a subdivision did not violate the rule against per-
petuities since any contingency would be performed, if at all,
within the period permitted by the rule.60 The court further distin-
guished United Virginia Bank v. Union Oil,61 wherein a contin-
gency depended upon performance by a third party.
L. Subdivision
The rule that a county has no authority to require a developer to
make off-site improvements on existing public roads in order to
obtain the county's approval of an otherwise acceptable subdivi-
sion was laid down in Hylton Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Super-
visors.6 2 More recently, in Board of County Supervisors v. Sie-
Gray Developers, Inc.,63 the issue presented was whether a devel-
oper may agree voluntarily to make such improvements. The trial
court, relying on Hylton, ruled that the county had no authority to
make such requirements and sustained the defendant's motion to
strike the evidence. The supreme court, however, ruled that where
the developer voluntarily agreed to make improvements, he should
be prevented from complaining that the agreement was ultra vires.
The court stated that "one who makes a contract with a munici-
pality is estopped to assert that it was ultra vires, when it is sought
to be enforced against him. '6 4 Justice Russell, in a most persuasive
dissent, perceived that the agreement was coerced and properly
was refused enforcement by the trial court.6 5
60. Id. at 465, 331 S.E.2d at 404.
61. 214 Va. 48, 197 S.E.2d 175 (1973).
62. 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979).
63. 230 Va. 24, 334 S.E.2d 542 (1985).
64. Id. at 30, 334 S.E.2d at 546.
65. Justice Russell stated that:
when Hall, the original developer here, submitted a proper plan, the County re-
fused to approve it for [failure to agree to offsite improvements]. Hall sold to [the
present developer], which agreed to improve the existing road because, and only be-
cause, it could obtain the County's approval in no other way. Both Hall and [present
developer] were faced with a simple choice: either 'agree' to make the road improve-
ments or forget the proposed development .... I think the trial court correctly de-
termined that the 'agreement' was coerced and properly refused to enforce it.
Id. at 33, 334 S.E.2d at 548 (Russell, J., dissenting).
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M. Zoning
1. Condominiums
In Natrella v. Board of Zoning Appeals,6 the supreme court af-
firmed the trial court's decision upholding the Board of Zoning Ap-
peals' (BZA) grant of certain variances which would permit conver-
sion of the apartments to condominiums because the landowners
demonstrated, by sufficient evidence, that denial of the variances
constituted an undue hardship.
2. Jurisdiction and Standing
Two key procedural issues were decided by the Virginia Su-
preme Court in Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v.
Board of Zoning Appeals.67 The first issue was whether an appeal
from the circuit court reviewing a decision of the BZA properly lies
with the Court of Appeals of Virginia or the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia. The second issue involved a question of standing. Appellant,
Virginia Beach Beautification Commission ("Commission"), filed a
petition for writ of certiorari 8 in circuit court seeking reversal of
the BZA's decision to grant a height and setback variance to Hotel
Associates ("Hotel"), which permitted construction of a billboard
situated near the Virginia Beach-Norfolk Expressway. The trial
court ruled that the Commission lacked standing and dismissed
the petition.6 9
On appeal, Hotel contended that exclusive jurisdiction over
cases from circuit courts deciding appeals from administrative
agencies lies with the court of appeals under section 17-116.05(1)
of the Code.70 The supreme court rejected Hotel's interpretation.
The court reasoned that the General Assembly, under the Admin-
istrative Process Act,"' had defined "agency" to mean "board...
66. 231 Va. 451, 345 S.E.2d 295 (1986).
67. 231 Va. 415, 344 S.E.2d 899 (1986).
68. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
69. The court did not decide whether a petition for certiorari under § 15.1-497 is an ap-
peal from a decision of a Board of Zoning Appeals within the meaning of § 17-116.05(1). See
Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 231 Va. 421, 344 S.E.2d 903 (1986). A related
issue pertaining to standing was decided the same day as Virginia Beach Beautification in
Chesapeake House on the Bay, Inc. v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 231 Va. 440, 344 S.E.2d 913
(1986), wherein the supreme court affirmed the trial court's refusal to permit a substitution
of parties plaintiff where the original plaintiff had no standing to maintain the action.
70. Virginia Beach Beautification, 231 Va. at 416, 344 S.E.2d at 901.
71. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to -6.14:25 (Repl. Vol. 1985 and Cum. Supp. 1986).
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of the state government" '72 and that municipal corporations and
counties are exempt from the provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cess Act. 3 Therefore, the court concluded that the BZA is not a
board of the state government and thus the court of appeals lacks
jurisdiction over such matters."'
The supreme court also upheld the circuit court's determination
of the Commission's lack of standing. The court agreed that the
Commission is a "person" under section 15.1-497 of the Virginia
Code, but held that the Commission does not meet the test for a
person "aggrieved. '7 5 The court determined that the Commission,
which neither owned nor occupied real property within close prox-
imity to the subject property of the variance, advanced no direct,
immediate, pecuniary or substantial interest in the Board's deci-
sion different from that of the general public.7 6
3. Variances
In Board of Zoning Appeals v. O'Malley," the BZA had denied
the landowners' application for multiple zoning variances. Upon
appeal, the circuit court reversed. However, the supreme court re-
versed and held that the landowners had failed to overcome the
presumption of correctness applicable to the BZA's action. The
court found that the landowners had not established that the de-
nial of the variance unreasonably restricted the use of their prop-
erty. 8 Further, the court reasoned that the landowners' right to
use their property, which was located in a transitional zone in
which both residential and commercial uses were permitted, was a
conditional right, not an absolute one.79
In Lawrence Transfer & Storage Corp. v. Board of Zoning Ap-
peals,80 a case of first impression, the court decided which land-
owners are entitled to written notice of a proposed zoning change,
including special exceptions and variances, as provided in Code
72. Id. § 9-6.14:4(A) (Repl. Vol. 1985).
73. Virginia Beach Beautification, 231 Va. at 417, 344 S.E.2d at 901.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 419, 344 S.E.2d at 902.
76. Id. at 419-20, 344 S.E.2d at 903.
77. 229 Va. 605, 331 S.E.2d 481 (1985).
78. Id. at 608, 331 S.E.2d at 483.
79. Id. at 609, 331 S.E.2d at 483.
80. 229 Va. 568, 331 S.E.2d 460 (1985).
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sections 15.1-431 and 15.1-496.81 In this case, neighboring land-
owners brought an action challenging the BZA's grant of a special
use permit. Plaintiffs alleged that the BZA had failed to comply
with the notice provisions of section 15.1-431 before conducting
the hearing on the application. The subject property was a ten acre
tract lying within the boundaries of the vendors' 205 acre tract.
None of the owners of land abutting the 205 acre tract received
written notice of the hearing. However, notice was published in the
newspaper by the BZA. The trial court affirmed the BZA's action
and concluded that only owners abutting the ten acre tract, which
included owners of the 205 acres, were entitled to notice. The land-
owners asserted that the ten acre tract was not a separate parcel
but merely an unsubdivided parcel of the 205 acre tract. The BZA
countered that the statute applies solely to property undergoing a
zoning change.
The supreme court reversed, concluding that all abutting owners
of the 205 acre tract were entitled to written notice.82 Code section
15.1-431 mandates written notice to three categories of landowners:
(1) owners of the parcel involved; (2) owners of all abutting prop-
erty; and (3) owners of property immediately across the street or
road from the property affected. 83 The court reasoned that the lan-
guage of the statute applied to the parcel owners of the 205 acre
tract. The court concluded that to hold otherwise permitted easy
circumvention of the legislature's intent by simply carving out a
smaller parcel from the core of a larger tract of land. 4
N. Warranty of New Dwelling
Seabright v. Nesselrodt85 involved a dispute between the vend-
ees of a new dwelling and the vendor/builder of the dwelling. Code
section 55-70.1 establishes certain warranties by a vendor in the
sale of new dwellings. The Frederick County Circuit Court held
that the warranties of section 55-70.1 related to the dwelling and
its fixtures and did not extend to grading the land and landscap-
ing. However, the court implied that if the landscaping had been
so defective as to throw surface water against the foundation of the
dwelling, thereby causing seepage or undermining of the founda-
81. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-431, -496 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
82. Lawrence Transfer & Storage Corp., 229 Va. at 571, 331 S.E.2d at 462.
83. Id. at 571, 331 S.E.2d at 462.
84. Id.
85. 4 Va. Cir. 322 (Frederick County 1985).
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tion, a different result might be required. In this case, however,
there was no evidence of physical impact on the dwelling."8
86. Id. at 324-25.
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